Allow me to begin my review of Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber’s new volume
Darka shel Halakha, with a few words of introduction.[1] I have the greatest respect for Prof. Sperber both as a scholar par excellence and as a human being. Over the almost 35 years I have been at Bar-Ilan University, we have developed a warm friendship and mutual respect. He writes clearly and beautifully, with great knowledge, sensitivity and depth – and his book
Darka shel Halakha is no exception. Nevertheless, I am forced to disagree with his analysis and conclusions. I strongly believe that we have to be sensitive to women’s spiritual needs or as Hazal say: לעשות נחת רוח לנשים (Sifra, Parsheta 2; Hagiga 16b). But at the same time, we have to be honest about what the halakha clearly states – so that, at the same time, we will not be guilty of האהבה מקלקלת את השורה.
The question of women receiving
aliyyot, which lies at the center of
Darka shel Halakha, is briefly discussed in a baraita cited in the
Talmud Megilla (23a) which reads (Source 1):
(1) תלמוד בבלי מסכת מגילה דף כג עמוד א
תנו רבנן: הכל עולין למנין שבעה, ואפילו קטן ואפילו אשה. אבל אמרו חכמים: אשה לא תקרא בתורה, מפני כבוד צבור.
Despite the above negative ruling of the Talmud and, in its wake, of all subsequent codifiers,[2] within the last decade, there have been two major attempts to reopen this issue. One was penned by R. Mendel Shapiro[3] who argues that
kevod ha-tsibbur is a social concept – and a woman’s general standing in society was lower than men’s. Nowadays when this is no longer true, a community can be mohel on its
kavod – voluntarily set aside its honor. He errs, however, since the vast majority of
rishonim and
aharonim disagree with his analysis.
Kevod ha-tsibbur has nothing to do with social standing. The vast majority of
posekim maintain that
kevod ha-tsibbur stems from women’s lack of obligation in
keri’at haTorah, and expresses itself either in terms of
tsniut or
zilzul ha-mitsvah. The
Tsniut School argues that women should not be at the center of communal ritual unnecessarily – and this is particularly true by
keri’at haTorah, from which they are freed. The second school maintains that there is an issue of
zilzul ha-mitsva in that the men who are duty-bound should fulfill the
mitsva that is incumbent upon them – and not delegate it to those who are not obligated.[4]
The second attempt is that of R. Prof. Daniel Sperber,[5] in
Darka shel Halakha, and I would like to focus on two major issues.
Kevod haTsibbur: Instruction or Recommendation?
Firstly, R. Sperber has suggested that the phrase in Megilla 23a “However, the Rabbis declared: a woman should not read from the Torah – because of
kevod ha-tsibbur” describes what
Hazal believed to be the preferred or recommended mode of conduct, the ideal way of performing
keri’at haTorah.
Indeed,
ke-darko ba-kodesh, Prof. Sperber surveys all the places where it states אבל אמרו חכמים and shows that some cases are merely expressions of the ideal, while others refer to things that are actually assur. Yet, he concludes [Note 19, p. 21] that that in the case of women’s aliyyot: "לא נראה שמדובר ... בתקנת חז"ל אלא שאינו ראוי"
This position is very problematic, particularly in this case of women’s
aliyyot which is one of
kevod ha-tsibbur.
(1) Firstly,
Meiri, Kiryat Sefer, Ma’amar 5, sec. a, writes (Source 2):
(2) מאירי, קרית ספר, מאמר חמישי חלק א
נמצאת למד ...שהכל עולין למנין ז' אפילו אשה וקטן…, אלא שמיחו באשה מפני כבוד צבור...
The word “מיחו” appears many times in the Mishnaic and Tamudic literature and it refers to strongly verbalized objection and public reproof. See for example, Source 3.
(3) מסכת פסחים פרק ד משנה ח
משנה: ששה דברים עשו אנשי יריחו על שלשה מיחו בידם ועל שלשה לא מיחו בידם
רמב"ם: אלו הששה דברים כולם היו שלא ברצון חכמים, אלא שעל שלשה מהם - והם הראשונים - לא מיחו בידם חכמים, ושלשה המנויים באחרונה מיחו בידם.
Clearly, from the Meiri’s perspective, the statement אבל אמרו חכמים by women’s
aliyyot is not a simple recommendation.
(2) Secondly, there is a group of
rishonim and
aharonim who maintain that in the specific case of women’s
aliyyot, women cannot receive
aliyyot, even in cases of
she’at ha-dehak or
be-diavad. This school includes the Rambam and Semag and many subsequent
aharonim (R. Abraham Pinso; R. Matsli’ah Mazuz; R. Ben-Zion Lichtman, R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg and R. Isaac Zilberstein). For example, Rambam (Sources 4 and 5) writes without any qualification that women may not receive
aliyyot:
(4) רמב"ם הלכות תפילה ונשיאת כפים פרק יב, הלכה יז
אשה לא תקרא בציבור מפני כבוד הציבור…
(5) הרב מסעוד חי רוקח, מעשה רוקח שם
ורבינו כתב קיצור הדין ד-"אשה לא תקרא מפני כבוד הציבור", א"כ נאסר לגמרי…
Semag (Source 6) records that minors may receive aliyyot, but makes no mention of women whatsoever. On the contrary, he maintains (Sources 7 and 8) that women cannot motsi men in megilla, even be-di-avad, just as they can’t receive aliyyot.
(6) הרב משה בן יעקב מקוצי, ספר מצוות גדול (סמ"ג), עשין סימן יט
כמה [הם] הקוראים, בשבת בשחרית שבעה .. וקטן היודע לקרות ויודע למי מברכים עולה בשבעה למניין.
(7) ספר מצוות גדול – מצוות מדרבנן, הלכות מגילה
…דאף על גב דנשים חייבות במקרא מגילה אינן מוציאות את הזכרים. ואל תשיבני נר חנוכה דאמרינן בפרק במה מדליקין (שבת כג, א) דאשה מדלקת משמע אף להוציא האיש. דשאני מקרא מגילה שהוא כמו קריאת התורה לכך אינה מוציאה את האיש.
(8) מגן אברהם סימן תרפט ס"ק ה
"וי"א שהנשים אינם מוציאות את האנשים "
אינם מוציאות - ול"ד לנרות חנוכה דשאני מגילה דהוי כמו קריאת התורה (סמ"ג) פי' ופסולה מפני כבוד הצבור ולכן אפי' ליחיד אין מוציאה דלא פלוג (רא"ם)
Clearly, according to these authorities, the statement אבל אמרו חכמים is not a simple recommendation.
(3) There is another very large group of posekim (perhaps the majority) led by the R. Yoel Sirkis (Ba”h; Sources 9 and 10) who maintain that one cannot be mohel on
kevod ha-tsibbur – particularly in the case of women’s
aliyyot. However,
bi-she’at ha-dehak – where there is no alternative or no one else eligible - a woman can read, lest
keri’at haTorah be cancelled. It is to such cases that the Gemara in Megilla was referring.
(9) הרב יואל סירקיס, בית חדש (ב"ח) טור או"ח סימן נ"ג ד"ה "ואין ממנין"
…אלא הדבר פשוט, כיון שכך תקנו חכמים דחששו לכבוד ציבור, אין ביד הציבור למחול.
(10) בית חדש, טור אורח חיים סימן קמ"ד
... מה שתיקנו חכמים .. משום כבוד הציבור לא תקנו מתחילה אלא היכא שאפשר
For example, in a case of a city with only kohanim cited by Rabbi Sperber himself, Maharam mi-Rothenburg (Source 11) permits women to receive the third through seventh aliya. Otherwise the Torah reading would not occur, for the lineage of the kohanim would be challenged were they to receive the remaining
aliyyot. In the language of the Maharam:
(11) שו"ת מהר"ם מרוטנברג חלק ד (דפוס פראג) סימן קח
...ועיר שכולה כהנים ואין בה [אפי'] ישראל אחד נראה לי דכהן קורא פעמיים ושוב יקראו נשים דהכל משלימי' למנין ז' אפי' עבד ושפחה וקטן (מגילה כ"ג ע"א). ונהי דמסיק עלה אבל אמרו חכמי' לא תקרא אשה בתורה מפני כבוד הצבור, היכא דלא אפשר ידחה כבוד הצבור מפני פגם כהנים הקוראים שלא יאמרו בני גרושות.
Maharam mi-Rothenburg was only willing to permit
bi-she’at ha-dehak. This certainly doesn’t sound like a recommendation המלצה. Rather it is permission given only
bi-she’at ha-dehak.
It would seem to me that in
Darka shel Halakha there is a blurring of the difference between
le-khathila and
be-di-avad. For example,
Hazal say that one should not use a
milchig spoon שאינו בן יומו (not used in last 24 hours) to stir hot chicken soup. Similarly,
Hazal indicate that one shouldn’t eat out of utensils that haven’t been immersed in a mikva. In both cases,
be-di-avad, the food remains perfectly kosher.
Hazal’s ruling in both these cases is not a recommendation - but rather a clear directive how one is required to act; under normative conditions, it is assur to act otherwise. This is also true regarding women’s
aliyyot –
Hazal forbade it
le-khathila, even though
be-di-avad or
bi-she’at ha-dehak the
aliyya may be valid.
Now it should be appreciated that from Prof. Sperber’s perspective it is important that אבל אמרו חכמים be only a המלצה. Prof. Sperber wants to maintain that there really is no “down side” to women getting
aliyyot. However, to my mind, he errs –
kevod ha-tsibbur is a
takana le-khathila, not a recommendation.
In this regard, I would also like to briefly mention one further crucial point, relevant to both the papers of R. Mendel Shapiro and R. Daniel Sperber – but which we will not be able to develop fully here at
the Seforim blog.[6] When
Hazal talked about women getting
aliyyot, they were referring to a system in which the oleh made the
berakhot and read aloud - for himself and the community. However, nowadays, the job of the
oleh is bifurcated: the
oleh makes the
berakhot and
ba’al korei reads aloud. This raises a fundamental question: how can one person make
berakhot, while another does the
ma’aseh ha-mitsva. For there not to be a
berakha le-vatalah there must be a mechanism to transfer the reading from the
ba’al korei to the
oleh. That mechanism is either
shom’eah ke-oneh or
shelihut. But both mechanisms require that both the
oleh and
ba’al korei be obligated – otherwise there is no
areivut. Since women are not obligated in
keri’at haTorah, they can serve neither as the
oleh nor as the
ba’al korei - me-ikkar ha-din – because the
birkhot haTorah of the
oleh will be
berakhot levatalah. Note that all this has nothing to do with kevod haTsibbur. The only case in which the issue of
kevod haTsibbur begins is in the uncommon case where a woman makes the berakhot and reads for herself.[7] Hence, under a bifurcated system, there is a clear downside in allowing women to read or serve as olot – a proliferation of
berakhot le-vatala!
Does Kevod haBeriyyot Defer Kevod haTsibbur –
The Rules of Kevod haBeriyyot Lets now turn to the second issue – and this is Prof. Sperber’s major
hiddush in this book. Briefly, Prof. Sperber notes that there is a concept in halakha called
kevod ha-beriyyot which refers to shame or embarrassment (בושה או בזיון) which would result from the fulfillment of a religious obligation. The view of the
halakha is that
kevod ha-beriyyot can defer rabbinic obligations and prohibitions. Hence, Prof. Sperber maintains that if there is a community of women who are offended by their not receiving
aliyyot – because of the rabbinic rule of
kevod hatsibbur, then
kevod ha-beriyyot should defer
kevod ha-tsibbur.
Professor Sperber’s book is devoted to describing the use of
kevod ha-beriyyot in the halakhic literature. He is by no means the first to do this and the subject is extensively reviewed and analyzed by Rabbis Rakover,[8] Blidstein,[9] Lichtenstein,[10] Feldman,[11] and many others.[12]
Let’s begin with the Gemara in
Berakhot 19b:
(12) תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יט עמוד ב
(א) אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: המוצא כלאים בבגדו פושטן אפילו בשוק, מאי טעמא (משלי כ"א) "אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה'" - כל מקום שיש חלול השם אין חולקין כבוד לרב.
(ב) מתיבי: קברו את המת וחזרו, ולפניהם שתי דרכים, אחת טהורה ואחת טמאה, בא בטהורה - באין עמו בטהורה, בא בטמאה - באין עמו בטמאה, משום כבודו. [רוב הראשונים גורסים: באים בטמאה, בא עמהם משום כבודם] אמאי? לימא: אין חכמה ואין תבונה לנגד ה'. תרגמה רבי אבא בבית הפרס דרבנן
(ג)...תא שמע: גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה [את] לא תעשה שבתורה. ואמאי? לימא: אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה'! - תרגמה רב בר שבא קמיה דרב כהנא בלאו (דברים י"ז, יא) דלא תסור [מן הדבר אשר יגידו לך ימין ושמאל[ ...כל מילי דרבנן אסמכינהו על לאו דלא תסור, ומשום כבודו שרו רבנן.
(ד) רש"י: כל מילי דרבנן וכו' - והכי קאמר להו: דבר שהוא מדברי סופרים נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות, וקרי ליה לא תעשה - משום דכתיב לא תסור, ודקא קשיא לכו דאורייתא הוא, רבנן אחלוה ליקרייהו לעבור על דבריהם היכא דאיכא כבוד הבריות.
The upshot of this Gemara is that if one is wearing
sha’atnez – the wearer is obligated to remove it even in the marketplace, despite any possible embarrassment. The Gemara explains that G-d’s honor/dignity takes priority over that of Man. However, if the garment is only rabbinically forbidden, one can wait until they return home to change. The reason is that
kevod ha-beriyyot, the honor of the individual, can defer rabbinic prohibitions.
Prof. Sperber adequately shows that
kevod ha-beriyyot has always been an important consideration in pesak. However, an in-depth survey of the responsa literature over the past 1000 years makes it clear that it cannot be invoked indiscriminately. Indeed, as the gedolei ha-posekim make apparent, there are clearly defined parameters which Prof. Sperber seems to ignore. Hence, R. Sperber’s application of
kevod ha-beriyyot to the issue of women’s aliyyot is seriously flawed. In this brief presentation, we will discuss nine of the aforementioned principles.
(1) Firstly,
kevod ha-tsibbur is merely the kevod ha-beriyyot of the tsibbur.[13] Hence it makes no sense that the honor of the individual should have priority over the honor of a large collection of individuals. Indeed, this is explicitly stated by the 13th century Meiri. [Source 13; Meiri is referring to Source 12ב]
(13) מאירי, בית הבחירה, ברכות דף יט עמוד ב:
{יש גורסים בא בטומאה באין עמו. ואין הדברים נראין} שאין כבוד רבים נדחה מפני יחיד או יחידים, [וכן הוא] באבל רבתי...ואף בתלמוד המערב...
(2) Secondly, The Meiri (Source 14) also emphatically states:
(14) מאירי, בית הבחירה, ברכות דף יט עמוד ב:
...שלא אמרה תורה כבד אחרים בקלון עצמך...
Giving women
aliyyot by overriding
kevod ha-tsibbur with
kevod ha-beriyyot would effectively be honoring women by dishonoring the community – and, hence, cannot be done.
(3) R. Sperber’s suggestion would ask us to uproot completely the rabbinic ban on women’s aliyyot. However, kevod ha-beriyyot can only temporarily set aside a rabbinic ordinance. As stated in the Jerusalem Talmud (Source 15):
(15) תלמוד ירושלמי כלאים פ"ט ה"א, לב ע"א
הרי שהיה מהלך בשוק ונמצא לבוש כלאים, תרין אמוראין (שני אמוראים חולקים בדבר): חד אמר אסור; וחרנה (ואחר) אמר מותר. מאן דאמר אסור - דבר תורה; מאן דאמר מותר - כההיא דאמר רבי זעירא: גדול כבוד הרבים שהוא דוחה את המצוה בלא תעשה שעה אחת.
Many of the commentaries on the Yerushlami and posekim hold that this proviso of sha’ah ahat applies to Rabbinic mitsvot as well – including: Tosafot, Ketubot 103b, end of s.v. “Oto”; Or Zarua, Hilkhot Erev Shabbat, sec. 6; Penei Moshe; Vilna Gaon; R. David Pardo; Arukh haShulhan (Source 16); and others.
(16) ערוך השולחן, יו"ד סימן ש"ג, סעיף ב:
שאני הכא [בכלאים] דהוא לשעה קלה, דכשיבא לביתו יגידו לו ויפשוט. ..ואפי' באיסור דרבנן תמידי נ"ל דמחוייב להגיד לו, ואין למנוע מצד כבוד הבריות
(4) Next, many posekim including R. Yair Hayyim Bachrach, R. Meir Simha of Dvinsk (Source 17), R. Jeroham Perlow, R. Moses Feinstein, R. Chaim Zev Reines indicate that the “dishonor” that is engendered must result from an act of disgrace - not from refraining to give honor. As Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk writes:
(17) אור שמח (הרב מאיר שמחה הכהן מדווינסק) הלכות יו"ט פרק ו, הלכה י"ד
גדול כבוד הבריות...זה דווקא במידי דבזיונא הוא לבריות, אבל...ענין של כבוד...מי שרי?
Only in cases where kavod is obligatory (e.g., for a King or mourner) is the absence of kavod considered embarrassing, as indicated by R. Isaac Blazer (Source 18),
(18) שו"ת פרי יצחק, נד (הרב יצחק בלזר)
צריך לומר דסבירא להו לגמרא במקום שהכבוד מחוייב גם העדר כבוד הוא בכלל כבוד הבריות, דהעדר כבוד הוא כמו גנאי... ועיין בכתובות (דף סט) מניין שאבל יושב בראש....
Prof. Yaakov Blidstein discusses burial on
Yom Tov sheini shel galuyot, which is permitted because
Yom Tov sheni is
de-rabbanan, while not burying is
kevod ha-beriyyot.[14] However, a long list of
posekim will not permit 20 individuals to violate Yom Tov sheni to attend to a burial, when only 10 are required to bury the deceased and the additional 10 would be coming along out of honor. Only the first 10 are permitted.
Similarly, in the case of
aliyyot, no act of shame has been performed to all those not called to the Torah (both men and women); they are simply not honored.
Kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be activated under such conditions.
R. Daniel Sperber in his book
Darka shel Halakha (p. 77, note 104) attempts to challenge this principle - that
kevod ha-beriyyot is inapplicable when no act of shame has been performed. He cites the fact that a bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur (Source 19).
(19) מסכת יומא פרק ח משנה א
משנה: יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה וברחיצה ובסיכה ובנעילת הסנדל ובתשמיש המטה והמלך והכלה ירחצו את פניהם והחיה תנעול את הסנדל דברי רבי אליעזר וחכמים אוסרין:
רשי והכלה - צריכה נוי עד שתחבב על בעלה, וכל שלשים יום לחופתה היא קרויה כלה.
ר' עובדיה מברטנורא: והכלה - צריכה נוי כדי לחבבה על בעלה. וכל שלשים יום קרויה כלה:
R. Sperber assumes that the prohibition against washing on Yom Kippur is rabbinic (when many authorities hold it is biblical) and that the permission to wash stems from
kevod ha-beriyyot. Based on this, he wants to demonstrate that the shame here results from something that was not done.
This analysis is in error because the leniency for a bride has nothing to do with
kevod ha-beriyyot. What was forbidden was
rehitsa shel ta’anug, but not washing of necessity, e.g., for cleanliness. A bride is permitted to wash her face on Yom Kippur, so that her face would not be displeasing in her new grooms eyes – and this is considered laving of necessity. As Rashi and Rav write (Source 19 above), a bride requires beauty.
R. Sperber (p. 83) further cites a responsum of R. Isaiah of Trani, Resp. haRid, sec. 21 which permits the lighting of candles in the synagogue on Yom Tov because of “
kevod ha-beriyyot.” R. Sperber attempts to use this example to demonstrate that
kevod ha-beriyyot can set aside prohibitions even if it is only to honor those who are attending synagogue.
Unfortunately, he errs in his analysis here as well. Similar teshuvot are found from the Rid, Rosh and Maharam of Rothenburg.[15] And their goal is to show that lighting candles in the synagogue come under the rubric of tsorekh okhel nefesh because they honor people (Rid), the synagogue (Maharam) or the holiday (Rosh). Once it its
tsorekh okhel nefesh, it is the
tsorekh okhel nefesh which defers the prohibition.
(5) Nearly all authorities – including, inter alia, R. Naftali Amsterdam (Source 20), R. Elhanan Bunim Wasserman, R. Makiel Tsvi haLevi Tannenbaum, Rav Yitzchak Nissim (Source 21), R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Elijah Bakshi Doron (Source 22), R. Israel Shepansky - maintain that
kevod ha-beriyyot requires an objective standard that affects or is appreciated by all.
(20) שו"ת פרי יצחק, נג
הרב נפתלי אמשטרדם: כי הנה כבוד הבריות לא נאמר רק על דבר שהוא גנאי לכל מין האנושי יהיה מאיזה מין שיהיה, כמו מת מצוה או לילך ערום שרוב בני האדם מתביישים מזה. אבל בדבר שהבזיון מתייחס רק לאדם הזה לפי תכונתו, כמו לישא שק או קופה, בזה לא שייך כלל לפטור מטעם כבוד הבריות.
(21) הרב יצחק ניסים, תשובה כתב יד, מרחשון תשכ"ד (יד הרב ניסים)
וכמובן שתלך [הבת מצווה] לפני כן לבית הכנסת להתפלל, אבל לא לעלות לתורה. הלכה מפורשת היא שאין אשה קוראת בתורה בציבור, ואין משנים את ההלכה לפי הרגשות של בני אדם.
(22) הרב אליהו בקשי דורון, שו"ת בנין אב, ח"ב, סימן נ"ה, אות ג'
...כבוד האבל דין הוא שיש לכבד כל האבלים, ובכגון זה כבוד הבריות שיכבדו האבל... אבל אדם פרטי שמחליט לכבד את עצמו...כבודו משיקולים פרטיים אינו יכול לפטור אותו, או לדחות איסור דרבנן.
This view explicitly rejects subjective standards - in which what is embarrassing results from the idiosyncrasies or hypersensitivities of an individual or small group. The vast majority of religiously committed women are not offended when they do not receive an
aliyya. Indeed, they understand and accept the halakhic given, although some might clearly have preferred it to be otherwise.
More importantly, does it make
halakhic sense that if a group of women – nay, any group, says: “this Rabbinic halakha offends me” – be it
mehitsa,
tsni’ut,
kashrut,
stam yeynam, many aspects of
taharat ha-mishpahah, who counts for a minyan, and who can serve as a
hazzan - then we should have a carte blanche to go about abrogating it. Such a position is untenable, if not unthinkable.[16]
(6) Many leading scholars[17] emphasize that, as in the cases of
kevod ha-beriyyot discussed in
Berakhot 19b and elsewhere, the shame must result from extraneous factors. Thus, removing the
kilayyim garment per se’ is not what causes the shame. Rather, it is that one has no other garment underneath and, hence, remains naked. In such cases,
kevod ha-beriyyot can be invoked to nullify the rabbinic commandment which leads to the dishonor. However,
kevod ha-beroyyot cannot be invoked to nullify a rabbinic commandment, where the shame comes from the very fulfillment of the rabbinic injunction itself.
Take for example one who is invited to dine with his colleagues or clients, would we allow him to avoid embarrassment by eating fruit and vegetables from which
terumot and
ma’asrot (which nowadays is Rabbinic) have not been removed, or by consuming
hamets she-avar alav haPesah, or by drinking
stam yeynam (wine touched or poured by a non-Jew). Or alternatively, suppose someone is at a meeting and is ashamed to walk out in order to daven
Minha. And what about prayers at the airport in between flights. Would we allow him to forgo his rabbinic prayer obligation because of this embarrassment?
The answer is that in those cases where acting according to
halakha - be it to not eat
terumot and
ma’asrot, or to not drink
stam yeynam, or to fulfill ones prayer obligation – creates the embarrassment, then
kevod ha-beriyyot cannot set aside the Rabbinic prohibition. One should be proud to be fulfilling the
halakha. Similarly,
kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be invoked to uproot the rabbinic consideration of
kevod ha-tsibbur which prevents women’s
aliyyot. This is because the dishonor stems directly from the very fact that women are not given
aliyyot in accordance with the rabbinic guidelines.
(7) That the rabbis of the Talmud were sensitive to women’s spiritual needs is evident from the rabbinic concept of
nahat ru’ah (spiritual satisfaction), which was invoked in a variety of instances to permit certain special dispensations for women.[18] R. Sperber maintains that this concept is an expression of kevod ha-beriyyot.[19] Yet, despite this admitted sensitivity,
Hazal themselves were not concerned about kevod ha-beriyyot when they ruled that, because of
kevod ha-tsibbur, women should not
le-khathila receive
aliyyot. Hence, how can we?
This argument is all the more true according to the explanation of Rashi on the mechanism of
kevod ha-beriyyot deferments. Rashi (Source 12ד cited above) explains that in instances of
kevod ha-beriyyot the Rabbis “forgo their honor to allow their edict to be violated.”
(12) תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יט עמוד ב
..... כל מילי דרבנן אסמכינהו על לאו דלא תסור, ומשום כבודו שרו רבנן.
(ד) רש"י כל מילי דרבנן וכו' - והכי קאמר להו: דבר שהוא מדברי סופרים נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות, וקרי ליה לא תעשה - משום דכתיב לא תסור, ודקא קשיא לכו דאורייתא הוא, רבנן אחלוה ליקרייהו לעבור על דבריהם היכא דאיכא כבוד הבריות.
It is one thing if the clash is unexpected, unanticipated and accidental. But in the case of
keri’at haTorah, it was
Hazal themselves who knowingly set up the rule of
kevod ha-tsibbur which precludes women from
aliyyot. Why would we expect them to forgo their honor in such a case?
(8) The Rivash (Resp. Rivash, sec 226) forbade sewing baby clothes during hol ha-moed for a newborn’s circumcision despite the parents’ desire to dress him properly and festively for the event. One of Rivash’s rationales is that since all understand that new clothes cannot be sewn on
hol ha-moed - because
Hazal forbade it,
kevod ha-beriyyot cannot be invoked to circumvent this rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, one cannot invoke
kevod ha-beriyyot to allow women to receive aliyyot, because all understand that this has been synagogue procedure for two millennia and that the Rabbis of the Talmud themselves prohibited it.
(9) Rivash (ibid.) and Havot Yair (sec. 95) and others rule against extending the leniency of kevod ha-beriyyot beyond those instances explicitly discussed by Hazal - honor of the deceased (כבוד המת), personal hygiene dealing with excrement, undress, and the wholeness of the family unit. New cases may not be comparable in their nature or severity to the original examples. Indeed, as noted by Prof. Blidstein and R. Aharon Lichtenstein,[20] throughout the two millennia of post-Talmudic responsa literature, kevod ha-beriyyot is rarely if ever cited as the sole or even major grounds for overriding a bona fide rabbinic ordinance. It always appears as one of many additional reasons to be lenient (
snif le-hakel). This is indeed the case in nearly all the instances cited at length by R. Daniel Sperber in his book
Darka shel Halakha.
What’s more, in those instances where
kevod ha-beriyyot is invoked essentially alone, it is because the matter being deferred is a mere, often unbased, stringency (
humra be-alma). For example, the custom in some communities prohibiting menstruants to enter the synagogue – which Prof. Sperber has returned to repeatedly (Sperber, pp. 74) - is what the
posekim call a
humra ve-silsul be-alma. Hence, the fact that even in such stringent communities, menstruants visited the sanctuary on the High Holidays - would be a classic example of
kevod ha-beriyyot overruling a
humra be-alma.
Now Prof. Sperber will respond, that he too would only invoke
kevod ha-beriyyot in the case of women’s
aliyyot. After all, there is no real down side - at most we have only violated a recommendation. However, as we have argued above, “
aval amru hakhamim” is not a recommendation by women’s
aliyyot - but a prohibition
le-khathilla. What’s more, a woman who gets an aliyya without reading for herself or who is only the
ba’alat keria is responsible for generating
berakhot levatala. We have also argued that Prof. Sperber has improperly invoked
kevod ha-beriyyot for the case of women’s
aliyyot because he has not taken into consideration the
kelalim of the
gedolei ha-posekim.
I would like to close with one last point. Despite the fact that we strongly disagree with Prof. Sperber’s conclusion, he after all did w
